AfxLoadLibrary

Vulnerable to "tainted" DLLs placed in a location in the search path before the intended DLL

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Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

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Attack Category	Resource Injection		
Vulnerability Category	Indeterminate File/Path		
Software Context	 Process Management File Path Management		
Location	The Lath Wanagement		
Description	AfxLoadLibrary() and CoLoadLibrary() have many implicit, default behaviors that can give an attacker an opportunity to inject object code into your code base.		
	The AfxLoadLibrary() function is used to load code from a DLL library. The system will use ".DLL" for the file extension if it is not specified. If the path for the library to load is not fully qualified, then the system will search the following locations in this order:		
	1. The directory from which the application loaded.		
	2. The current working directory. (Could be affected by chdir())		
	3. The Windows system or system32 directory. On Windows 95/98/Me this is the Windows system directory. On more recent versions of windows it is system32.		
	4. Windows NT only: The 16-bit Windows system directory. There is no Win32 function that obtains the path of this directory, but it is searched. The default name of this directory is SYSTEM.		
	5. The Windows directory (typically C: \WINDOWS or C:\WINNT).		
	6. Each directory listed in the PATH environment variable, in the order they are listed.		
	A somewhat different search strategy is used for CoLoadLibrary().		

 $^{1. \}quad http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/about_us/authors/35-BSI.html~(Barnum, Sean)\\$

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	This issue has rep XPSP1, Windows	-				
APIs	FunctionName		Comments			
	AfxLoadLibrary					
	CoLoadLibrary	CoLoadLibrary				
	CoLoadLibrary	CoLoadLibrary				
Method of Attack	An attacker could inject a Trojan horse DLL within your process by placing a "tainted" DLL in a location in the DLL search path that is found before the intended DLL.					
Exception Criteria						
Solutions	Solution Applicability	Solution Description		Solution Efficacy		
	When library is loaded.		bName er e a lified , g the	Effective if eidentified file is secure from tampering.		
Signature Details	Definite positive signature: call to AfxLoadLibrary() with a literal string that does not begin with "\\" or "[A-Z]:\" Possible positive signature: call to AfxLoadLibrary() with a string or character array variable Definite negative signature:call to AfxLoadLibrary() with a literal string that begins with a drive letter or UNC path (e.g. "\\")					
Examples of Incorrect Code	// or	AfxLoadLibrary("MyLib");				
Examples of Corrected Code	AfxLoadLibrary("C:\\Program Files\\MyCompany\\MyProg\\MyLib.DLL"); // or AfxLoadLibrary("\\\Server\\Share\\Path\\MyLib.DLL");					
Source References						
Recommended Resources		Wisd's reference for Attaboad Blotary				
Discriminant Set		MSDN reference for CoLoadLibrary ³ Operating Systems				

	•	Windows XP Home
	•	Windows XP Pro
	•	Win32
Languages	•	С
	•	C++

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